. Social capital is a phenomenon that depends not only on policy, but also on culture (Allik, Realo, 2004; Inglehart, Baker, 2000) . Social capital is based on a societies values and it shapes these values (Bankston, 2004) . Since values and culture itself change during the modernization process, we expect social capital of the members of such culture to change as well. However, the social capital appearance of representatives of traditional and modern cultures is not well studied so far. 
Introduction
Cultural modernization leads to great changes in the relationships among the members of a society.
Thereby, cultural values undergo the most drastic changes.
Step by step, traditional values are substituted by secular-rational values and survival values are replaced by self-expression values (Inglehart, Baker, 2000) . Social capital is a phenomenon that depends not only on policy, but also on culture (Allik, Realo, 2004; Inglehart, Baker, 2000) . Social capital is based on a societies values and it shapes these values (Bankston, 2004) . Since values and culture itself change during the modernization process, we expect social capital of the members of such culture to change as well. However, the social capital appearance of representatives of traditional and modern cultures is not well studied so far. Thus, this paper aims to answer the question if cultural background explains individual social capital (=social resource) access. How does the social capital of representatives of traditional cultures differ from the members of modern cultures? Our research is dedicated to finding answers to these questions. Is difficult to investigate the change of social capital during the process of cultural modernization, because it takes a lot of time and appropriate data is difficult to find. However, we can compare the characteristics of the social capital between individuals of traditional and post-modernized cultures. This will allow us to analyze the differences and understand the main trends in social capital of traditional and modernized cultures.
In detail, we base our research on the cultural map of Inglehart and Welzel (2010) . We analyze the differences between two sets of respondents: from societies holding predominantly secular-rational The paper is structured as follows. The first part introduces the social capital concept and formulates hypotheses regarding the connection between network embeddedness and social capital access. Furthermore, we discuss possible influences of culture on network formation and social capital access. The second part focuses on the researched groups and categorizes them into the cultural map of Inglehart and Welzel (2010) because both of them are not part of the World Values Study and cannot be classified using it. The third part introduces the data and the results are shown in part four. Finally, the paper concludes in a discussion of the results.
Our study indicates that cultural background matters for social capital access, because it affects social network formation. Regarding networks, we find a clear difference along the continuum of capital access from a friendship network, only Russians access more than the three other groups. Finally, the family network does not determine social capital access, but the friendship network does.
Social Capital
Social capital has evolved into a key concept in current social sciences as it shows value in explaining success of individuals in their professional life (e.g. Behtoui, 2007; Burt, 1992 Burt, , 2000 Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 1999 Lin, , 2001 ), but also the well functioning of a society (e.g. Engström et al., 2008; Kawachi et al., 1997 Kawachi et al., , 1999 Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 2000) . Although the conceptualizations of social capital are manifold (cf. Coleman, 1988 Coleman, , 1990 Burt, 1992; Putnam, 2000; Lin, 2001 ; for an overview see Häuberer, 2011) , most concepts share Bourdieus ' (1986: 248) idea that social capital consists of "actual or potential resources linked to a membership in a group". We take this position and refer to social resources as social capital only, because social resources initially represent what is meant by capital.
Resources can be used to attain goals and individuals can easily invest in their volume by creating their networks. Individuals access concrete social resources -like help with the yearly tax declaration or having the shopping done if sick -in their networks depending on their prior investment in it. Spending time with network members and assisting them when they need help forms a basis for exchanging social resources. Help represents a donation of resources, and thus, starting or maintaining resource transfer.
Such action builds social capital (Plickert et al., 2007: 406) . Empirical results evidence this connection.
Analyzing Eurobarometer data, Häuberer (2014) indicated that social resource access strongly depends on embeddedness in informal and formal networks. Individuals living in big households, having regular contact with their friends, colleagues and neighbours and who participate in associations (with the exception of associations pursuing political goals) had better access to social resources. Recently, Mollenhorst et al. (2014) showed that social resource access depends on the opportunity to maintain or create relationships. Persons an individual is in regular contact with are the ones perceived as sources of social resources.
The literature review shows that network embeddedness depicts a crucial precondition for social capital access (Häuberer, 2011: 150) . Individuals are embedded in informal networks composed of family members or friends and formal networks formed in associations (Putnam, 2000 The composition of individuals' networks is well researched. So far, we know that the size and characteristics of individuals' networks vary according to individual socio-demographic characteristics.
Men tend to have larger networks than women. Individuals with high education access larger networks than individuals with low education (Behtoui, 2007; Lin et al., 2001 ). Age plays a crucial role in social network composition as well. With increasing age social contacts accumulate. That is, access to different occupations increases during life, however, decreases in high ages (McDonald, Mair, 2010) .
Old people tend to have strong ties mostly with family. Networks of young people are mostly composed of friendship ties (van Tilburg, 1998) . This also means that social capital access varies according to sex, age and education. The findings are consistent regardless of whether social capital is measured by potential social capital access -indicated by access to individuals with occupations of high prestige (Position Generator, cf. Lin et al., 2001 ) -, or access to concrete resources: women, younger respondents and higher educated individuals tend to have greater access to social resources than men, older and less well educated respondents (Häuberer, 2014) .
Another important precondition for network formation, and therefore social capital access, is the cultural background and values individuals hold. Because it is a point not well researched yet, this paper aims at closing this gap.
Cultural Background, Social Network Formation and Social Capital Access
Culture forms the characteristics of a social environment in which an individual will act and therefore influences the way individuals act (Berry et al., 1997: 66) . The characteristics of the industrial structure of a country -the scale of businesses, their distribution in the economic system, and organizational methods of individual firms -are due to its culture (Fukuyama, 1995) . According to Lewin's (1935) field theory -perceiving the personality of an individual as a function of life space and interactions -, Berry et al. (1997: 66) suppose that the behaviour of an individual is a function of personal traits like attitudes, personal characteristics and the social environment. This means that individuals' behaviour is a function of the interaction of their personality characteristics and features of the environment, which, in fact, the culture relates to. Therefore, we expect culture to affect how individuals create their social networks and how they invest in networks, which -as a result -influences individual social capital access. Ideas about the cultural causation of social capital have been expressed time after time (cf. Putnam, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Allik, Realo, 2004 Also Bankston (2004: 177) highlights in reference to Coleman that social capital may not be just a representation of a relationship structure between individuals, but quite the opposite, it must be seen in connection to values, beliefs and expectations, which are maintained and transferred within a group.
In cultural comparative research, two main dimensions of cultural variation are evident: variation on a traditional to secular-rational spectrum of values, and a variation from survival to self-expression values (Inglehart, 2006) . Traditional values are represented by high importance of religious believes, intensive family ties, patriotism and nationalism. Secular-rational values are indicated by absence of religious faith, acceptance of pluralized life forms, and the rejection of authority. The former exist in predominantly agrarian societies while the latter exist in industrialized societies (Inglehart, 2006: 120; Inglehart, Welzel, 2010: 553) . In contrast to traditional societies, modernized or industrialized societies feature a high degree of urbanization along with single households and predominance of nuclear families. Individuals of traditional societies tend to stay their whole life in the group they were born into, because it equals their economic group (de Vries, 1961: 64, 219) . Traditional cultures foster crafting of traditional items and eating traditional types of food and exercise their native language and cultural forms (de Vries, 1961: 61) . Accordingly, professional occupations differ as well. While traditional cultures are engaged in activities that do not need technical equipment, people in modern cultures engage in activities that do (Inkeles, Smith, 1974) .
Survival values are connected to physical and economic security. They come along with materialist attitudes and intolerance to minorities. In contrast, self-expression values emphasize, for example, freedom and quality of life, post-materialist attitudes, and tolerance towards people that are different (Inglehart, 2006 : 120, Inglehart, Welzel, 2010 . The scale of survival and self-expression values is comparable to Hofstede's (1980) collectivism and individualism scale and Schwartz ' (1994) embeddedness and autonomy scale (Inglehart, 2006: 125f) , and with Parsons Pattern Variables on collectivity orientation and self-orientation (Parsons, 1970: 67) . According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2010) (Inglehart, Welzel, 2010: 554 6 ).
Research on the effect of values on social capital formation is rare. Matters are even more complicated as studies mainly use different social capital definitions. Allik and Realo (2004) showed that a relationship exists between collective social capital (indicated by trust and associational involvement) and the psychological dimension of culture, such as individualist vs. collectivist values.
The study found high correlations of trust, associational memberships and individualism for 43
countries. The tendency of individualistic cultures to have greater trust and formal networks than collectivist cultures even remained after controlling for GDP (cf. Allik, Realo, 2004: 41) . For our network perspective on social capital, this study gives some valuable insights into the size of formal networks as they seem bigger in individualized societies. This even holds after splitting collectivism indicators into indicators of familism and institutional collectivism practices. High familism even decreases associational participation; institutional collectivism practices seem unrelated to formal networks (Realo et al., 2008: 457) .
Concerning individual social capital, we know about one study only that analyzes cultural aspects of social capital. This study reveals contrary results to the above discussed. It was demonstrated that individual social capital is positively associated with collectivist orientation and negatively correlated with individualistic orientation (Beilmann, Realo, 2012) . As the author's social capital index is composed of trust, honesty and interest in politics, it leaves no answer about the relationship of individualism and network composition, and thus, resource access of individuals. This is where our paper comes in. We argue that characteristics of the discussed societal types allow us to draw 
Studied Ethnic Groups: Cultural Differences of Czechs, Russians, Chechens, and Dagestanis
To analyze the relation between social capital access and cultural background, we compare four cultural groups -Czechs, Russians, Chechens, and Dagestanis -whose representatives have similar and different features. First, all four countries are post-communist states (cf. Inglehart, Baker, 2000) . The
Russians, Chechens and Dagestanis live in the Russian Federation and the Czechs in the Czech Republic -once part of the former socialist Czechoslovakia. Accordingly, ideology and social system were similar for the members of these cultures. We know that under communism especially informal networks were formed alternatively to the state and forced participation in formal networks (Raiser et al., 2001 ).
As Dagestan and Chechnya did not take part in the World Values Survey, we cannot simply classify them according to the cultural map of Inglehart and Welzel (2010) . Furthermore, we analyzed a sample of Russians living in Moscow. As Moscow is one of the most developed regions in Russia, we expect the values of the Russians in our sample to differ from the rest of Russia. Thus, we more accurately analyze the cultural similarities and differences between members of these ethnic groups in the following. We use criteria derived in part 1.1 accompanied by criteria derived from relevant literature on the subject (cf. de Vries, 1961; Chance, 1965 , Dressler, 1982 Inkeles, Smith, 1974) : (Izvestiya, 2010) . Furthermore, Czech Republic is the most secular country in Europe -in 2011 79% of the population indicated to be no believer (Czech Statistical Office, 2013b) .
Comparing the religious involvement to the cultural map of Inglehart and Welzel (2010) 
means that
Czechs should hold the most secular-rational and self-expression values, followed by Russia. Chechens and Dagestanis hold more traditional and survival values.
Place of residence (community urbanization level). Urban residents can be considered as
representatives of a more modernized group than rural residents (Inkeles, Smith, 1974: 292) , usually associated with secular-rational values (cf. Inglehart and Welzel, 2010 Type of food. The traditional type of food according to the natural and ecological environment is typical for less modernized cultures (de Vries, 1961: 64) . Dominating use of store-bought foodstuffs is indicative of a large modernized culture. Regardless of other food sources the peoples of the North Caucasus use the traditional type of food. Moreover, when moving to the central parts of Russia, they typically retain their food preferences towards industrially processed food.
The level of well-being. Generally, post-modernization is characterized by increasing economic well-being, which also results in higher levels of individual well-being (Inglehart, Welzel, 2010 also increases (Inkeles, Smith, 1974: 297) . In the European part of Russia and the Czech Republic, the education level is higher than that of the residents of the North Caucasus. In 2012, the share of the population with a higher education in Moscow was 41%, but only 18% in the Republic of Dagestan, and in the Chechen Republic this index was less than 15% (RIA-News, 2012). In the Czech Republic, 37%
of individuals held at least an A-level degree in 2011 (Czech Statistical Office, 2013a).
Relational orientation. Representatives of traditional cultures are oriented mainly on intra-family relations, whereas the representatives of post-modernized cultures are focused on extra-family social contacts (Inglehart, Welzel, 2010: 563) , which is true for Czechs and Russians. Furthermore, representatives of the peoples of the Russian North Caucasus have a greater importance of values in Schwartz's methodology (Schwartz, 2006) describing the other people's orientation (Universalism, Benevolence), i.e. self-transcendence (Lebedeva, Grigoryan, 2013) . The Muslim peoples of the North
Caucasus especially favour values such as conformity, tradition, and universalism. All these values mean more individual focus on other people rather than on themselves (Lebedeva, Grigoryan, 2012) indicating collectivist and thus, survival values.
Consequently At the same time, these are four independent ethnic groups with different languages and, therefore, if comparing them individually in terms of individual social capital, we will be able to isolate the elements which: a) have ethnic differences (e.g. between the Russians and all other groups or the Chechens and all other groups etc); b) have cross-cultural differences (between the Russians and Czechs on the one hand, and the Chechens, Dagestanis on the other).
Data and Measures

Data
To test our hypotheses, we analyze data of two surveys administered in Czech Republic and in the Russian Federation. The Czech survey "Social Relationships among Czech Citizens" was designed as a test-retest study. The respondents were interviewed at two points in time (2007 and 2008) wherein the second round 129 of the 400 respondents of the first wave participated. Here, we refer to data of the second wave as it included most items also applied in the Russian study. The survey was carried out by the social research institute SC&C Ltd.. It included respondents over 18, randomly collected and refined by quotas to represent Czech society (Häuberer, 2011) . For the analyses presented here, we selected a subsample of Russians from Moscow, Dagestanis and Chechens (N=718, see also Table 1 ) from this Russian sample. Thereby, we generated similar sample sizes of the different ethnic groups like in the Czech sample. Finally, we merged the data with the Czech sample.
Dependent variables
Social capital. We measured social capital by social resources received from informal networks (family and friends) by the person. Such resources range from receiving help in house repair to legal and financial assistance (Häuberer, 2011; van der Gaag, Snijders, 2005; Verhaeghe, Tampubolon, 2012) . We modified the wording where it was necessary to fit the Russian context, as Häuberer (2011) did in the Czech context as well. This method asks how many family members and how many friends/acquaintances the respondent has who "can advise them on legal or bureaucratic issues", "are able to help the respondent to find a job", "can employ people", "work at the municipal or other types of state authorities", "are well up in financial questions" (tax, subsidies, social support, pension insurance); and who "earn a great amount of money" (see Appendix A.1).
Independent variables
Size of informal networks. We measured the informal network of a family by asking respondents about the contact frequency with parents 7 , brothers and sisters, children, uncles, aunts, and cousins (Häuberer, 2011; van der Gaag, Snijders, 2005; Verhaeghe, Tampubolon, 2012) . The contact frequency to family members was measured on a four point scale where high values indicate contact three or more times a month and the lowest value indicates the absence of a living relative of this kind (see Appendix A.1).
We measured the informal network of friends by asking for the respondents' number of friends in the workplace, in the neighbourhood and elsewhere (cf. Häuberer 2011).
Size of the formal networks. We measured the formal network with organizational involvement by asking the respondents about their participation frequency in four different types of associations like a political party, church, sport organization, or civic organization (see Appendix A.1; cf. Häuberer, 2011; Yang, 2007; Beilmann, Realo, 2012) . We dichotomized the variables because of two reasons: first, the participation frequency was measured in the Czech survey at a three point scale, but the Russian survey used a five-point scale. Second, the participation rates are extremely low in both countries. Whereas differentiating contact frequencies does not add any explaining value.
Cultural background. This was measured by ethnicity of the respondent, indicated by dummy variables (Czech, Russian, Dagestan and Chechen origin).
Control variables
We included sex, age and education as control variables. Education was measured on different scales in both surveys, thus we constructed a dichotomous education variable where 0 indicates elementary and skilled education and 1 indicates A-level education and university degree (see Appendix A.1). The reader will find the demographics in Table 1 . In all samples except the Czech one, more women participated than men. The respondents were on average between 26 and 43 years old. Concerning education, almost 50% of Russians and Czechs had at minimum an A-level degree, while only 27% of the Dagestanis and 21% of the Chechens had it.
7 Contact frequency to parents was measured separately for mother and father in the Czech survey. As the Czech respondents had more contact with mother than father, we used the contact frequency to mother as indicator for contact frequency to parents. 
Analysis Strategy
For all analyses, we merged the data into a single data set. To get an idea of differences in social networks and social capital among the researched groups, we compare the median values of the network and social capital measures by nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (Field, 2001 : 46-49) using SPSS 19. For evaluating significant differences between percent shares we have used φ criteriaFischer's angular transformation (Gubler, Genkin, 1973) . This criterion evaluates the significance of differences between the percentages of two samples in which the effect of interest is registered.
As these univariate analyses are not able to control for background variables, we additionally calculated structural equation models using Amos 20 to assess the connection between networks, cultural background and social capital. This method allows us to test all hypotheses at once and to better control for errors than other multivariate approaches because it deconstructs valid variance as well as systematic and random error variances (Urban, Mayerl, 2014: 17) .
Results
Descriptive Comparisons
Social Networks. At first we compare the four groups -Czechs, Russians, Dagestanis, and Chechens according to their network embeddedness. Figure 2 displays the contact frequencies to their family members of the respondents of the four groups and Table 2 shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests difference analyses. Our results demonstrate that quite few differences occur; however, the following trend can be deduced: The smallest number of differences can be observed between the responses of Chechens and Dagestanis. This points out that the representatives of these two traditional cultures reveal similar densities in their ties with relatives. In this case, Chechens and Dagestanis (mostly) have a higher contact frequency with their relatives than Russians and Czechs. This is in accordance to Hypothesis 2a assuming individuals from traditional societies to have a denser family network than individuals from post-modernized societies. Further, we have assumed that Russians and Czechs would be very similar, but they are not. As a matter of fact, there are also quite large differences between the Russian and the Czechs. The density of contacts with their parents and adult siblings is higher among Czechs, while contacts with uncles/aunts and cousins seem more frequent among Russians. Adult siblings 2.8*** 5.4*** 5.4*** 2.1*** 1.9** .7
Uncles or aunts 1.9*** 2.5*** 2.7*** 2.9*** 3.1*** .7
Cousins 2.1*** 3.4*** 3.6*** 4.2*** 3.4*** .6
Notes: Merged data from projects: "Social Relationships among Czech Citizens", and "Values and Economical
Behavior"; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Z); N = 847; ***p<0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Figure 3 and Finally, Figure 4 and We think these results can be explained as follows. Notes: Merged Data from projects: "Social Relationships among Czech Citizens", and "Values and Economical
Behavior"; φ (Fischer's angular transformation); N = 847; ***p<0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Social Capital. In a second step, we compare the social capital access of the four analyzed groups.
Therefore, Figure 5 and Table 5 show the differences in the social capital access of the respondents originated by kinship. In most cases, Czechs access the highest amount of social capital from family. This is in contrast to Hypothesis 3а supposing individuals living in traditional societies access more social capital in their families than persons from post-modernized backgrounds. As regards Russians, social resource access by family appears to be lower than that of all other ethnic groups. With one exception, however, the Russians have more relatives who earn a lot. By this indicator they significantly differ from Czechs, but still do not differ from the Chechens and Dagestanis. Quite surprising is the fact that given these numerous differences, the representatives of all four ethnic groups showed no difference in terms of the number of relatives who could recruit personnel and enter into employment contracts.
Most likely, this indicator has low discriminatory power -the majority of the respondents have roughly the same resources in this field. Notes: Merged Data from projects: "Social Relationships among Czech Citizens", and "Values and Economical
Behavior"; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Z); N = 847; ***p<0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
20 Figure 6 and Table 6 1.5* 2.6*** 4.1*** 0.7 2.0*** 2.5*** … will be able to help you find a job? 0.5 3.0*** 3.2*** 1.9** 2.6*** 1.2 … have the possibility to hire employees?
1.7** 3.9*** 3.7*** 1.4* 1.8** While the respondents from traditional ethnic groups have denser family networks than the respondents from post-modern ethnic groups, the latter access more social capital in their families. Regarding the friendship network and social capital it contains, we find no clear pattern regarding cultural background.
Only post-modern countries seem to have bigger formal networks than traditional groups.
So far, the analyses did not allow us to test the relation between network embeddedness and social capital access. This will be done in the next part.
Figure 7: Structural Equation Model of Social Capital Access by Networks and Cultural Background
Notes: The analyses were controlled for sex, age, and education. Dagestan = reference category for cultural background.
Multivariate Analyses: Structural Equation Model
In a third step, we calculated a Structural Equation Model (SEM), to test our hypotheses while controlling for other influencing factors like socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The calculated SEM is displayed in Figure 7 . We constructed five latent variables. The factors 'contact with family', 'informal network size' and 'formal network size' indicate network embeddedness. The factors 'social capital -family' and 'social capital -friends' indicate accessed social resources from the respective groups. The reader finds the factor loadings in Appendix A.2 and the results of the SEM in Table 7 .
Our results indicate that the cultural background of the respondent seems to play a crucial role in network composition and social capital access. We included 'dummy' variables indicating Russian, Czech, Chechen, and Dagestani origin, where Dagestani origin depicts our reference category. The social capital access seems to be better explained by ethnic background than network embeddedness. We do not find an influence of the family network embeddedness on family social capital. Thus, Hypothesis 1a has to be rejected. Here, the cultural background matters. First, when calculating the models without the variables regarding cultural background (not reported here), we find a slightly positive impact of contact with family on social resources accessed by family. Second, our model (see Table 7 ) including the cultural background variables reveals that Russians and Czechs access more social capital in their families than Chechens and Dagestanis -a result which is in contrast to Hypothesis 3a. It seems frequent contact with family members does not automatically mean that the family network is a resource rich surrounding. On the one hand, the family may be the wrong place for
Chechens and Dagestanis to access resources of financial and prestigious means. On the other hand, the result also indicates that although Russians and Czechs have less contact with their families, they can more effectively attain resources from their family networks. This hints to an underlying explanatory factor: it is not the contact frequency that seems important, but the quality of the relationship. The family may not be perceived as a social capital source by individuals living in traditional societies, or may not have the means to provide social capital because of the low economic development. In traditional societies the families are broader and relatives live together including those with elderly parents. This leads to a higher frequency of contact between relatives. It means that a cultural lifestyle leads to a higher frequency of contacts between relatives. Such a lifestyle is not inherent in more modernized groups of Russians and Czechs. But, in post-modernized cultures, the family is likely to be considered as a source of social capital and has the means to provide resources, while in traditional cultures, despite the high involvement in family relationships and higher collectivism, the family is not a source of high social capital. This explanation is supported by the fact that collectivism is negatively correlated with social capital, while individualism has a positive relationship (Allik, Realo, 2004) .
Viewing the social capital accessed by friend, the results of the structural equation model support Hypothesis 1b. We find the size of the informal network has a positive and significant impact on the amount of social capital accessed by friends. However, we do not find any influence of the formal 
Conclusions
We analyzed the impact of cultural background on social network composition and social capital (=social resources) access. We assume that according to Ingleharts and Welzels (2010) This result offers perspectives for future research, as our study has the capacity to assess the influence of cultural background on access to social capital with rather financial and prestigious focus only. The distribution of personal support resources were neglected in our study. However, one can suppose that the access to personal support social capital differs also between traditional and post-modernized societies, as the latter have more means to replace, for example, personal care by a welfare state institution.
Finally, our results indicate that the cultural background of our sample does not clearly determine the social capital access in the friendship networks. This result allows us to conclude that traditional as well as post-modernized societies are similarly able to create resource rich friendship networks.
Besides the limitation of social resource measures, our data does not allow us to further investigate the reasons why our respondents vary in their contact frequency to relatives or friends. One of the reasons for these differences may be cultural, or another reason may be a certain demographic situation of not having specific kinds of relatives. For example, Russians of the present generation tend to have no siblings, as their parents were likely to have only one child. Additionally their parents died at a young age on average. Evidence in favour of this idea is the fact that the Czechs, in comparison to Russians, have a significantly higher frequency of contacts with parents, brothers, and sisters, although they are also representatives of a postmodern culture. Furthermore, less family contacts increase the importance of extra-family contacts, which may explain the importance of friendship networks in social capital support for Russians.
From our point of view, research on social networks and social capital in the cultures that are at different stages of the modernization process has broad prospects. The results, which we obtained, are worth being tested for stability in other cultures as well. Furthermore, social capital can be considered not only at the individual level -as our study did -but also at the group and societal levels. Other indicators of social capital are used at these levels of analysis. Future research may be dedicated to socio-cultural modernization effects on social capital in groups and in post-modernized societies. A good starting point seems the analysis of changes in general, social or institutional trust in terms of the modernization process. estimations; ***p<0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, # regression weight set to 1.
A1. Variable Description
